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JUSTIFYING A NEW FEDERAL                    
COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY? 
John W. Leardi∗ 
 
“The tenancy by the entirety since Blackstone has been an awkward 
compromise, renegotiated in each generation, and only belatedly catching 
up with social reality.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Craft,2 the Supreme Court held that a tenant by 
the entirety, as defined by Michigan law, possesses “property or rights 
to property” to which a federal tax lien3 can attach.4  This decision 
contradicts longstanding Supreme Court precedent reserving the 
power to create and define property ownership and rights to state 
governments.5  Previously, a federal tax lien could not attach to an 
entireties estate due to the peculiar state law fiction that neither 
spouse possesses an individual interest in the property.6 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2004, Seton Hall University School of Law;  B.S. 1997, University of 
Scranton. 
 1 John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common law Marital 
Estate, 1997 BYU. L. REV. 35, 48 (1997). 
 2 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). 
 3 Under the federal tax lien statute, a lien is an assessment for unpaid income 
tax liability levied upon a taxpayer by the Internal Revenue Service.  26 U.S.C. § 6321 
(2004). 
 4 Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
 5 See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 515 (1960) (concluding that state 
law determines the nature of the property interests one possesses); accord Oregon 
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (reaffirming 
the longstanding premise that “under our federal system, property ownership is not 
governed by a general federal law, but rather by the laws of the several states”). 
 6 United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 702 n.31 (1983) (citing United States v. 
Am. Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. 
Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951)); see also Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 
620, 623 (3d Cir. 1952) (holding that property held in entirety under Pennsylvania 
law is not subject to a federal tax lien because the “United States has no power to 
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Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent land ownership 
rooted in a common-law legal fiction that views married couples 
holding entireties property as a single entity.7  The defining feature of 
the tenancy is the protection from liens it affords.  Traditionally, liens 
or other judgments imposed on one spouse individually could not be 
enforced against property held in tenancy by the entirety because the 
debtor spouse had no separate or distinct interest in the estate.8  At 
common law, all transfers of property to a married couple were 
automatically held in tenancy by the entirety.9  Today, tenancy by the 
entirety is still recognized as a form of concurrent ownership in about 
one-half of the states.10 
The question presented in Craft was whether a tenant by the 
entirety, as defined by Michigan law, possesses “property or rights to 
property” to which a federal tax lien11 may attach.12  The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit previously held entireties property is 
exempt from federal tax liens levied against one spouse individually.13  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a tenant 
by the entirety has a separate property interest to which a federal tax 
lien can attach.14  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, 
concluded that a tenant by the entirety, as defined by Michigan law, 
possesses rights in the estate sufficient to constitute “property or 
rights to property”for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute, and 
therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.15 
Craft is particularly noteworthy in light of the Rehnquist Court’s16 
 
take property from one person, to satisfy the obligation of another, the delinquent 
spouse”). 
 7 J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 367 (1998). 
 8 Guerino J. Turano & Philip H. Ward, Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entirety: 
The Pros and Cons, 83 ILL. B.J. 309 (1995). 
 9 HYLTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 368. 
 10 Id. 
 11 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1954) (“If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses 
to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United 
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging 
to such person.”). 
 12 Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
 13 Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 14 Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. 
 15 Id. at 289. 
 16 The Rehnquist Court means each successive term of the Supreme Court 
commencing with the elevation of William H. Rehnquist from Associate to Chief 
Justice in 1986.  David M. O’Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Relations: 
What Happened to “Our Federalism”?, 9 J.L. & POL. 609, 610 (1993). 
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consistent protection of state sovereignty.17  Over the last decade, the 
Court asserted this view of federalism in numerous decisions limiting 
the scope of congressional powers.18  The Craft decision, however, 
contradicts that more general direction of the court by disregarding 
the lien protection afforded entireties property under Michigan law.19  
Craft firmly establishes the superiority of federal tax liens over state 
property law definitions.20 
One circumstance seemingly analogous to Craft is the possible 
attachment of federal drug-forfeiture laws to property held in tenancy 
by the entirety.  In theory, the property interest of a spouse found 
guilty under federal forfeiture laws cannot be reached while the 
entireties estate remains in effect.21  The Eleventh Circuit upheld this 
premise in concluding that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and 
Prevention Act of 197022 did not preempt Florida entirety law, which 
prevents the forfeiture of any portion of an innocent spouse’s interest 
in entireties property.23  The Third Circuit, however, has held that 
 
 17 Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme Court’s “New” Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 
16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 526 (2000).  Professor Crusto argues that the Rehnquist 
Court has taken constitutional authority away from the federal government and 
restored that authority to the states.  Id. 
 18 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (stating that the states possess 
sovereignty concurrent with that of the federal government, subject only to 
limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992) (concluding that while Congress has substantial power under the 
Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive 
waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon 
Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded 
Congress’s commerce clause authority, since possession of gun in local school zone 
was not economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce). 
 19 Craft, 535 U.S. at 276.  The Court held that despite the legal fiction created 
under Michigan law of tenancy by the entirety, each tenant possessed individual 
rights in the estate sufficient to possess “property or rights to property” to which a 
federal tax lien could attach.  Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309 (stating that the guilty spouse has no 
separate interest in the property, and state laws generally protect the indivisible 
interests of an innocent spouse by barring forfeiture of entireties property). 
 22 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (2003). 
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any 
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any 
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be 
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission 
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year’s 
imprisonment. 
Id. 
 23 United States v. One-Single Family Residence Without Buildings Located at 
15621 SW 20th Ave. Miami, FL, 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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one spouse’s innocent-owner defense does not preclude forfeiture of 
state entireties property based on an alleged violation of the same 
statute.24  Resolving this split ultimately hinges on whether the federal 
government’s interest in seizing property tied to narcotics is afforded 
the same deference by future courts as was the interest in collecting 
from delinquent taxpayers in Craft.25  At issue are two seemingly 
inapposite concerns: the preservation of an archaic legal fiction and 
significant federal prerogatives.26  Despite the current posture of the 
Supreme Court, Craft undoubtedly frustrates the right of states to 
define “property and rights to property.” 
Part I of this Comment tracks the historical development of the 
tenancy by the entirety from its feudal roots in England to its modern 
manifestations under state property laws.  Part II presents the Craft 
decision.  Part III discusses the potential scope of Craft, in light of the 
“new federalism”27 doctrine asserted by the Rehnquist Court.28  
Regardless of Craft’s eventual scope, Part IV analyzes whether its 
infringement into an area of the law traditionally reserved for the 
states is appropriate; primarily, whether the congressional goal of 
enforcing the tax code impliedly preempts29 any state law property 
classification that conflict with the overall federal scheme.  Or 
 
 24 United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d. 
73 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 25 Craft, 535 U.S. at 278 (“We look initially to state law to determine what rights 
the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law 
to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or 
‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”) (quoting 
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999)). 
 26 Barbara W. Sharp, Losing Sticks from the Bundle: Incompatibility of Tenancy by the 
Entireties and Drug Forfeiture Laws, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 197, 208 (1993).  In discussing the 
incompatibility of federal drug forfeiture laws and the tenancy by the entirety, 
Professor Sharp states that the tenancy by the entirety, as a “vestige from the feudal 
system,” cannot “function effectively as a means of modern concurrent ownership.”  
Id. 
 27 Federalism means “a system of government in which power is divided between 
a central authority and constituent political units.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).  Many legal scholars postulate 
that “the Rehnquist Court’s most significant changes in constitutional law have been 
in the area of federalism – limiting the scope of Congress’s powers, reviving the 
Tenth Amendment, and greatly expanding the sovereign immunity of the states.”  
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution, 36 TRIAL 84 (2000). 
 28 Crusto, supra note 17, at 519 (2000).  Professor Crusto speculates that the 
Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism seeks to elevate the power of state governments 
over that of the federal government and, in part, encourages state governments to 
pursue their own constitutional rights agenda.”  Id. 
 29 “If there is a conflict between federal and state law, the federal law controls 
and the state law is invalidated because federal law is supreme.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 284 (1997) (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)). 
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alternatively, as Justice Thomas warned in his dissent,30 did the Craft 
majority create a new federal common law31 of property, rooted in the 
potential for arbitrary applications of the tax code? 32  While it is clear 
that states reserve the right to define and recognize entireties 
property, it is equally clear that the federal government, at least with 
regard to the tax power, will no longer be bound by the states archaic 
property classifications. 
I. TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY 
A. Tenancy by the Entirety: In General 
The tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership 
that can exist only between a husband and wife.33  It creates the legal 
fiction that each spouse owns one hundred percent of the estate, and 
neither may sell or encumber it unilaterally.34  Each spouse maintains 
the right to use and enjoy the estate as well as the right to 
survivorship, which mandates that if one spouse predeceases the 
other, the surviving spouse takes the estate.35  No portion of the 
decedent spouse’s interest is devisable36 or descendible.37  Tenancy by 
the entirety differs from the joint tenancy with right of survivorship in 
that neither party may sever the tenancy unilaterally.38 
 
 30 Craft, 535 U.S. at 294 (Thomas, J., dissenting): 
By erasing the careful line between state laws that purport to disclaim 
or exempt property interests after the fact, which the federal tax lien 
does not respect, and state laws’ definition of property and property 
rights, which the federal tax lien does respect, the Court does not 
follow Drye, but rather creates a new federal common law of property. 
 31 Federal common law means “the judge-made law of federal courts, excluding 
the law in all cases governed by state law.  An example is the nonstatutory law 
applying to interstate streams of commerce.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 32 Due to the inherent contradiction between state property law of tenancy by the 
entirety and federal prerogatives under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien 
enforceable as to a taxpayer in one state, will not be enforceable as to a similarly 
situated taxpayer in another state based solely on differences in state property 
definitions. 
 33 HYLTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 366. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 The term “devise” means “giving property (usually real property) by will.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (7th ed. 1999). 
 37 The term “descent” means “the acquisition of real property by law, as by 
inheritance; the passing of intestate real property to heirs.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
456 (7th ed. 1999). 
 38 HYLTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 366.  If either spouse attempts to transfer his or 
her interest in entireties property unilaterally, the transfer ultimately fails.  Id.  Also, 
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In order for property to be held in tenancy by the entirety, “five 
unities” must be present.39  The unity of time40 requires each party to 
acquire an interest in the property at the same time.41  The unity of 
title42 requires both parties to acquire title to the property by the 
same legal instrument.43  The unity of interest44 requires that each 
party have an equal, undivided share, and an identical interest in the 
property as measured by duration.45  The unity of possession46 means 
both spouses must have the right to possession of the property as a 
whole.47  Finally, the unity of person48 can only be satisfied by a legal 
marriage.49  At common law, any property transferred to a married 
couple jointly automatically resulted in an entireties estate.50 
Neither spouse, acting unilaterally during the marriage, can 
terminate an entireties estate.51  The estate is only severed by the 
death of one spouse, legal termination of the marriage (divorce), or 
if both spouses convey the estate to a third party.52  Moreover, an 
estate held in tenancy by the entirety is not subject to partition,53 
either voluntarily or involuntarily.54  In most states, if the parties 
divorce, the “tenancy by the entirety is automatically converted to a 
tenancy in common.”55  Legal separation, as opposed to divorce, will 
not affect the estate.56 
The tenancy by the entirety has a few defining characteristics 
 
neither spouse can request a judicial partition of property held in tenancy by the 
entirety.  Id. 
 39 ROBERT C. LAWRENCE III, Basic Aspects of Common law Tenancies, in 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL 
INVESTORS, § 4:2:2 (publication page references are not available for this document). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 LAWRENCE, supra note 39, at § 4:2:2. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 HYLTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 368. 
 51 LAWRENCE, supra note 39, at § 4:2:2. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Partition means “the act of dividing; esp., the division of real property held 
jointly or in common by two or more persons into individually owned interests.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (7th ed. 1999). 
 54 LAWRENCE, supra note 39, at § 4:2:2. 
 55 Id.  For an example of a case holding as such, see Shepard v. Shepard, 336 So. 2d 
496 (Miss. 1976). 
 56 LAWRENCE, supra note 39, at § 4:2:2. 
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which distinguish it from the other common law tenancies.57  First, 
judgments and other liens against one spouse (individually, as 
opposed to against both spouses) are not enforced against property 
held in tenancy by the entirety.58  Second, creditors of one spouse in 
bankruptcy or some other form of insolvency cannot reach or sever 
an estate held in tenancy by the entirety.59  Third, the interest of a 
spouse found guilty under federal or state forfeiture laws is, at least 
theoretically,60 unreachable while the tenancy remains in effect.61  
Fourth, neither spouse can file for a judicial partition of the estate 
without the consent of the other.62  Fifth, neither spouse may 
unilaterally sever or encumber63 the estate, or sell his or her interest 
in it.64  Sixth, in most jurisdictions recognizing the tenancy, a 
surviving spouse is not able to disclaim the interest of the decedent 
spouse,65 and the Internal Revenue Service will not recognize any 
such disclaimer.66  Finally, “an adult child cannot be given title to the” 
property.67  A spouse cannot dispose of his or her undivided interest 
in the estate through a will or any other legal instrument.68 
 
 57 Id. (describing the joint tenancy with right of survivorship; tenancy in 
common; and tenancy by the entirety).  Tenancy means the “possession or 
occupancy of land by right or title.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (7th ed. 1999).  
Common law forms of property ownership are distinguished by the manner in which 
tenancy rights are distributed. 
 58 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.  Although entireties property is unreachable under state law, there is a split 
in judicial authority as to whether a federal forfeiture law (specifically 21 U.S.C. § 
881(a) (7)) may reach property held in entirety.  See supra notes 23-24 and 
accompanying text. 
 61 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309 (“[I]f the guilty spouse predeceases, it is 
not reachable at all.”). 
 62 Id. 
 63 To “encumber” means “a claim or liability that is attached to property or some 
other right and that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage; any property 
right that is not an ownership interest.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (7th ed. 1999).  
An encumbrance cannot defeat the transfer of possession, but it remains after the 
property right is transferred.  Id. 
 64 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309 (“This poses problems if the couple 
divorces, or if one spouse has become incompetent, has abandoned the other, or has 
otherwise disappeared.”). 
 65 Id. at 310. 
 66 Id.  (“[D]isclaiming sometimes gives an estate tax advantage.  If the disclaimer 
was made more than nine months after title was taken in tenancy by the entirety, the 
IRS will claim it was made too late.”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (“Tenancy by the entirety thus makes a common probate avoidance 
technique unavailable.”). 
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B. Tenancy by the Entirety: Historical Development 
The tenancy by the entirety first appeared sometime during the 
Middle Ages, originating in “the feudal system’s regime of land 
tenures.”69  Sir William Blackstone first mentioned the estate 
posthumously in the 1783 edition of the Commentaries, prepared by 
Richard Burn:70 
If an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither 
properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and 
wife being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the 
estate by moieties, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout et 
non per my: the consequence of which is, that neither the 
husband nor the wife can dispose of any part of it without the 
assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor.71 
At English common law, the tenancy was the only means by which a 
husband and wife could hold land.72  The unnamed estate described 
by Blackstone became known as the tenancy by the entirety because 
of its undivided and indivisible nature.73  The estate created the 
paradox of a severalty with two owners; the one tenant was in fact 
two.74  The foundation of an entirety estate is rooted in the anomaly 
that two persons are, under the law, one.75  The tenancy by the 
entirety was imported to the North American colonies as part of the 
English common law.76 
Early practical applications of the estate were plagued by gender-
bias.77  Courts consistently recognized “the right of use [of the marital 
estate] in the husband, even to the exclusion of the wife.”78  All profits 
generated by the estate were also solely the domain of the husband.79  
Under the law, the two were one, but in actuality the “husband was 
the one.”80  The wife’s entirety interest in the estate was essentially 
 
 69 Sharp, supra note 26, at 198. 
 70 Orth, supra note 1, at 38. 
 71 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 182 (1765).  
From 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, ¶ 610 (1991). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Orth, supra note 1, at 38. 
 74 Id. at 39. 
 75 Id. at 40.  (“[T]he law was trying to perform a particularly difficult form of 
doublethink: to think about two persons as though they were one.”). 
 76 Sharp, supra note 26, at 199. 
 77 Orth, supra note 1, at 40. 
 78 Id.  See, e.g., Voight v. Voight, 147 N.E. 887 (Mass. 1925). 
 79 Id.  See, e.g., Pineo v. White, 70 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1946); Childs v. Childs, 199 
N.E. 383 (Mass. 1936); North Carolina Bd. Of Architecture v. Lee, 142 S.E.2d 643 
(N.C. 1965). 
 80 JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 329 (6th ed. 1990). 
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nothing more than an indefeasible right of survivorship.81  One North 
Carolina court went so far as to concede, “[i]t is possible that a wife 
might receive no benefits at all from land held by the entireties if she 
predeceases her husband.”82 
Changing social attitudes during the nineteenth century, 
however, brought sweeping changes to the legal status of women.83  
Passage of married women’s property acts in several states during this 
period shook the already unstable foundations of the tenancy by the 
entirety.84  Once the rights of married women were created, many 
states took the position that the two were no longer one, and no 
longer recognized entireties estates, while others modified the 
tenancy to allow mutual control by both spouses.85  In England, where 
the estate originated, husband and wife took as joint tenants after the 
1882 Married Women’s Property Act, and in 1925, Parliament 
abolished the tenancy by the entirety.86  Well past the middle of the 
twentieth century, however, the tenancy by the entirety remained 
male dominated in a number of states.87  Despite the widespread 
enactment of legislation recognizing the property rights of married 
women, the husband remained “the one” under an estate held in 
entirety.88  With “glacial slowness,” states recognizing estates held in 
tenancy by the entirety legislated to equalize the rights of wives 
holding entireties property with their husbands.89  The overall 
 
 81 Orth, supra note 1, at 41. 
 82 Dearman v. Bruns, 1818 S.E.2d 809, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971). 
 83 Sharp, supra note 26, at 199.  From ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY, § 5.5 (5th ed. 1984). 
 84 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185 (1973).  (“Major 
reforms came in the married women’s property acts.  The first of these, a crude 
somewhat tentative version was enacted in 1839, in Mississippi.”). 
 85 Sharp, supra note 26, at 199.  From ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY, § 5.5 (5th ed. 1984). 
 86 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 39(6), Sched. I (Eng.) 
(converting tenancy by the entirety into joint tenancy). 
 87 See, e.g., D’Ercole v. D’Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (Mass. 1976): 
The tenancy by the entirety is designed particularly for married couples 
and may be employed only by them. . . .  This form of property 
ownership differs from the joint tenancy in two respects.  First, each 
tenant has an indefeasible right of survivorship in the entire tenancy, 
which cannot be defeated by any act taken individually by either spouse 
during his or her lifetime.  There can be no partition.  Second, the 
spouses do not have an equal right to control and possession of the 
property.  The husband during his lifetime has paramount rights to the 
property.   
Id. 
 88 Orth, supra note 1, at 43. 
 89 Id.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(a) (1984).  The Tenancy by the Entirety 
Reform Act expressly states that “[a] husband and wife shall have equal right to the 
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treatment of the subject by the states, however, remains a “patchwork 
of inconsistency.”90 
C. Tenancy by the Entirety: Modern Treatment 
The tenancy by the entirety exists in some form in twenty-five 
states and the District of Columbia (including Michigan, whose 
entirety law is at issue in the Craft decision).91  States still recognizing 
the tenancy have altered its common law characteristics by varying 
degrees.92  Many states, however, have retained certain defining 
characteristics of the tenancy by the entirety.93  Marriage remains a 
firm requirement.94  Both spouses retain an indestructible right of 
survivorship;95 therefore, neither husband nor wife can unilaterally 
convey or partition the estate.96  The presumption that any 
conveyance made to a married couple will be treated as a tenancy by 
the entirety has also survived in many jurisdictions.97 
The modern tenancy by the entirety, unlike the common law 
estate, can end in various ways, including divorce.98  The first way to 
sever the modern tenancy is by one spouse conveying his interest in 
 
control, use, possession, rents, income, and profits of real property held by them in 
tenancy by the entirety.”  Id.  This statute, however, also preserves the common law 
restraint on severance or encumbrance of the estate by the actions of one spouse: 
“Neither spouse may bargain, sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey or in any manner 
encumber any property so held without the written joinder of the other spouse.”  Id. 
 90 Sharp, supra note 26, at 199. 
 91 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, ¶ 620.3.  The states 
recognizing tenancy by the entirety are as follows: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, D.C., 
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming.  Id.  The 
states that simply mention tenancy by the entirety in their codes are: Arizona, 
Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah.  Id.  The states that have abolished tenancy by 
the entirety are as follows: California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at ¶ 621.1.  In a majority of states that still recognize tenancy by the entirety, 
divorce, since it destroys the essential unity of person, converts the estate into a 
tenancy in common.  Id. 
 95 Id. at ¶ 622.1 
 96 Id. at ¶ 622.2.  At common law, the husband had exclusive control over the 
entireties property and could convey or encumber it without his wife’s consent.  Id. 
 97 Id. at ¶ 621.2.  These states include: Arkansas, D.C., Florida, Indiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
and Rhode Island.  Id. 
 98 An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 264 
(1974). 
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the estate to the other spouse, thereby making the transferee spouse 
the sole owner of the property in fee simple absolute.99  Second, an 
agreement between the two spouses can terminate the estate.100  
Third, the death of one spouse automatically vests the survivor with 
fee simple ownership of the estate.101  Fourth, the tenancy is 
automatically converted to a tenancy in common upon divorce, with 
each ex-spouse vested with a one-half ownership interest in the 
estate.102  Finally, some jurisdictions hold that a unilateral bankruptcy 
petition by one spouse severs the entireties estate.103 
Jurisdictions recognizing tenancies by the entirety are sharply 
divided as to their treatment of a creditor’s claims against only one 
spouse.104  Although it is universally accepted that creditors of both 
spouses may proceed against entireties property, states rely upon 
three distinct approaches to the collection rights of creditors of only 
one spouse.105  The first approach allows creditors to proceed against 
the life estate106 of the indebted spouse, subject to the survivorship 
interest of the other spouse.107  The second approach allows creditors 
only to reach the indebted spouse’s survivorship interest.108  The third 
approach characterizes property held in tenancy by the entirety as 
wholly unreachable by creditors.109 
 
 99 See, e.g., Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d 638, 645 (Ryan, J., concurring). 
 100 See, e.g., Runco v. Ostroski, 65 A.2d 399, 400 (Pa. 1949); In re Daughtry, 221 
B.R. 889, 892 (Bankr. C.D. Fla. 1997) (consent to sale in bankruptcy context). 
 101 See, e.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1990), 
cert denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). 
 102 See, e.g., Sebold v. Sebold, 444 F.2d 864, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Smith v. Smith, 
107 S.E.2d 530, 534 (N.C. 1959); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.102 (West 1988). 
 103 Steven R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 
5 FLA. TAX REV. 415, 441 (2002). 
 104 Id. at 442. 
 105 Id.  Individual states address the rights of creditors of one spouse differently.  
These differences are found either within the state statutes authorizing entireties 
estates, or in the interpretation of those statutes by the state’s courts.  Id. 
 106 A “life estate” means “an estate only for the duration of a specified person’s 
life, usually the possessor’s.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (7th ed. 1999).  Each 
spouse holding property in entirety holds a life estate, or possesory interest, in the 
subject property, as well as the right of survivorship. 
 107 In re Pletz, 221 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 108 In re Ryan, 282 B.R. 742, 748 (D.R.I. 2002) (holding that a debtor’s contingent 
future interest in the entireties property was not exempt, and could be sold by a 
bankruptcy trustee). 
 109 United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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II. UNITED STATES V. CRAFT 
A. Background 
As discussed above, a creditor’s rights can be severely limited by 
state entirety laws because liens imposed on one spouse individually 
cannot attach to entireties property.110  The tenancy by the entirety 
hindered the ability of the IRS to collect from delinquent taxpayers 
holding entireties property.111  Early adjudication of this issue 
throughout the federal system112 led most observers to conclude that 
state law determined what constituted “property or rights to 
property” under § 6321, the federal tax lien statute.113  Subsequent 
decisions have remained steadfast that the “amenability of entireties 
interests and entireties property to the federal tax lien depends upon 
the terms of state law.”114  This exemption has become widely known 
as the “entireties bar.”115 
In Drye v. United States,116 however, the United States Supreme 
Court clarified the roles of federal and state law in defining property 
in tax lien attachment cases117 and devised a two-step analytical 
framework for determining whether a federal tax lien may attach to a 
particular property interest.118  First, the court determines the rights 
or interests a delinquent taxpayer has in the underlying property.119  
This query is answered by consulting state law.120  Second, the court 
determines whether those rights or interests, as defined by state law, 
rise to the level of “property or rights to property” under § 6321.121  
This inquiry, the Court concluded, is purely a question of federal 
 
 110 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309; see also Steven R. Johnson, After Drye: The 
Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entirety Interests, 75 IND. L. J. 
1163 (2000). 
 111 Johnson, supra note 103, at 442. 
 112 Id. at 442 n.162.  See, e.g., United States v. American Nat’l Bank, 255 F.2d 504 
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied as to another issue, 358 U.S. 838 (1959); Raffaele v. 
Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th 
Cir. 1951); Pettengill v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 10 (D. Vt. 1962); United States v. 
Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mich. 1945). 
 113 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1954). 
 114 Johnson, supra note 103, at 442. 
 115 Id. 
 116 528 U.S. 49 (1999). 
 117 Johnson, supra note 110, at 1163. 
 118 Johnson, supra note 103, at 421. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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law.122  Because these terms are not defined in either the statute itself 
or the underlying regulations, the Court construed the reach of 
§6321 broadly and determined that power or control over the 
underlying property constitutes “property or rights to property.”123 
Although the Drye decision dealt specifically with the attachment 
of federal tax liens to disclaimed inheritances, as opposed to property 
held in entirety, it served as an important precursor to Craft.124  After 
Drye, when analyzing a prospective federal tax lien attachment, state 
law determines the character of any property right the delinquent 
taxpayer may have had, but federal law determines whether or not, 
and at what point in time, a tax lien may attach to that property 
interest.125  It is under this rubric that the Supreme Court decided 
Craft.126 
B. Facts 
In 1972, Sandra and Donald Craft purchased the Berwyck 
property in Grand Rapids, Michigan (“Berwyck”) as tenants by the 
entirety.127  Mr. Craft failed to file personal income tax returns from 
1979 to 1986.128  As a result, in 1988, the Internal Revenue Service 
made an assessment of $482,446 against Mr. Craft for unpaid income 
tax liabilities.129  Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321, the federal tax lien 
attached to all “property or rights to property,” whether real or 
personal, belonging to Mr. Craft.130  Mr. Craft failed to satisfy the lien 
because he was insolvent from April 1980 to August of 1989.131 
In August of 1989, Donald and Sandra jointly executed a 
quitclaim deed after the lien notice was filed, transferring Berwyck to 
Mrs. Craft for one dollar.132  In 1992, when Sandra attempted to sell 
Berwyck to a third party for approximately $120,000, a title search 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 In Drye, the Court held that while state law determines what rights a taxpayer 
has in property, it becomes a question of federal law as to whether those rights 
amount to “property or rights to property” under the federal tax lien statute.  Drye, 
528 U.S. at 58.  This served as the framework under which the specific facts in Craft 
were analyzed.  Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. 
 125 See Miller v. Conte, 72 F. Supp. 2d 952, 958 n.6 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
 126 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 127 Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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revealed the lien.133  The IRS asserted that it was entitled to half of the 
sale proceeds because its lien attached to Mr. Craft’s interest in the 
property.134  The IRS also claimed that Mr. Craft fraudulently 
conveyed135 his interest in Berwyck to his wife.136  The IRS agreed to 
release the lien and to allow the sale to proceed, with the stipulation 
that half of the proceeds be held in escrow pending a judicial 
determination of the government’s interest in the property.137  Mrs. 
Craft brought “an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds.”138 
C. Procedural History 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan granted summary judgment to the government, holding 
that the federal tax lien attached to Mr. Craft’s interest in Berwyck at 
the moment of transfer to Mrs. Craft because the entireties estate was 
thereby severed.139  The district court concluded the sale for one-
dollar terminated the entirety estate, and the government was 
entitled to one-half of the value of the property—rather than one-half 
of the resulting proceeds.140  Both parties appealed the decision.141 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that the tax lien did not attach to Berwyck at the time of the 
transfer.142  Under Michigan law, the court explained, Mr. Craft had 
“no separate interest in property held as a tenant by the entirety” to 
which the lien could attach.143  The court then remanded the case to 
the district court for consideration “of the government’s alternative 
claim that the conveyance” of Berwyck to Mrs. Craft was fraudulent.144 
On remand, the district court concluded “that where, as here, 
state law makes property exempt from the claims of creditors, no 
fraudulent conveyance can occur.”145  However, the district court did 
 
 133 Craft, 535 U.S. at 277. 
 134 Id. 
 135 A conveyance means “the voluntary transfer of a right or of property.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 334 (7th ed. 1999). 
 136 Craft, 535 U.S. at 277. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680 (W.D. Mich. 1994). 
 140 Id.; Craft, 535 U.S. at 277. 
 141 Craft, 535 U.S. at 277. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Craft, 535 U.S. at 277 (citing Craft v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657-58 
(W.D. Mich. 1999)). 
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find that Mr. Craft’s use of non-exempt funds146 to make mortgage 
payments147 on Berwyck constituted a fraudulent act under state law.148  
As such, the court awarded the government a share of the sale 
proceeds equivalent to that amount.149  Both parties again appealed 
the findings of the district court, with the IRS once again claiming 
that its lien attached to Mr. Craft’s interest in Berwyck.150 
On the second appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the holding of 
the prior panel, affirming that the federal tax lien did not attach to 
Berwyck at the time of the transfer.151  Furthermore, the court upheld 
the fraud determination made by the district court with regard to Mr. 
Craft’s mortgage payments.152 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of 
whether a taxpayer’s interest in an estate held in tenancy by the 
entirety, as defined by Michigan law, constitutes “property or rights to 
property” to which a federal tax lien, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321, 
may attach.153 
D. The Decision 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and held that Donald 
Craft’s interest in Berwyck, prior to the conveyance to his wife, 
constituted “property” under § 6321, to which a federal tax lien could 
attach.154  Justice O’Connor relied on the analytical framework laid 
out by the Court in Drye.155  First, the Court determined that pursuant 
to Michigan law, Mr. Craft, as a tenant by the entirety, had a 
“substantial degree of control” over the underlying property.156  The 
Court then decided that such control constituted “property” within 
the meaning of the tax lien statute as a matter of federal law.157  
Justice O’Connor, citing Drye, concluded that “in determining 
whether a federal taxpayer’s state-law rights constitute ‘property’ or 
 
 146 Non-exempt funds refer to those of Mr. Craft’s property interests not 
protected by the entireties bar.  Craft, 535 U.S. at 277. 
 147 Paying the mortgage on exempted property with non-exempt funds shielded 
those funds from creditors.  Id. 
 148 Craft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 659. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. 
 151 Craft v. U.S., 233 F.3d 358, 363-69 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 152 Id. at 369-75. 
 153 Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. 
 154 Id. at 277. 
 155 See supra Part II-A. 
 156 Craft, 535 U.S. at 283. 
 157 Id. at 283. 
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‘rights to property,’ [t]he important consideration is the breadth of 
control the [taxpayer] could exercise over the property.”158 
Justice O’Connor’s rationale for the decision was based on a 
broad reading of the federal statute authorizing the lien.159  Justice 
O’Connor concluded that the statute on its face revealed the clear 
intent of Congress to subject every taxpayer interest in property to a 
federal tax lien.160  If the Court were to hold otherwise, Justice 
O’Connor reasoned, the entireties property would essentially belong 
to no one.161  Under the Michigan law of tenancy by the entirety, Mrs. 
Craft had no more interest in the property than did her husband; if 
neither spouse has an individual interest in the entireties property to 
which a lien may attach, nobody does.162  Justice O’Connor scoffed at 
the absurdity of such a result, noting that it would allow spouses to 
shield their property from federal taxation by holding it as tenants by 
the entirety under state law.163 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that Michigan chose to view the 
rights of state-law creditors much differently.164  Under Michigan law, 
property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is not 
subject to any lien or other judgment against either spouse alone.165  
Citing Drye again, the Court held that the exempt status created by 
the Michigan law does not impair the rights of the federal 
government.166  The Court stated that the interpretation of § 6321 was 
purely a question of federal law.167  Furthermore, the Court 
concluded, its analysis was in no way restricted by the decisions of 
“state courts answering similar questions under state law.”168 
As such, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth 
Circuit, and remanded the case for a proper valuation of the 
 
 158 Id. (citing Drye, 528 U.S. at 61). 
 159 Id. at 282-83 (citing United States v. Nat’l Bank of Com., 472 U.S. 713, 719-20 
(1985)). 
 160 Id. at 284. 
 161 Id. at 285. 
 162 Craft, 535 U.S. at 285. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 288. 
 165 Id. at 288 (“Land held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is not 
subject to levy under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or 
wife alone.”) (quoting Sanford v. Bertrau, 169 N.W. 880, 881 (Mich. Ct. App. 1918)). 
 166 Id. (citing Drye, 528 U.S. at 59); see also United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 
701 (1983)  (clarifying that the Supremacy Clause “provides the underpinning for 
the Federal Government’s right to sweep aside state-created exemptions”). 
 167 Craft, 585 U.S. at 288. 
 168 Id at 289. 
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husband’s interest in Berwyck.169  The Court directed the Sixth 
Circuit to evaluate the potential fraudulence of the 1989 conveyance 
to Mrs. Craft in light of the tax lien attaching to Mr. Craft’s interest 
before the transfer.170 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas voiced an unwillingness to dismiss 
state recognized forms of property ownership in favor of “an 
amorphous federal common law definition of property.”171  Justice 
Thomas sternly warned that the majority’s holding ignores the 
“primacy of state law in defining property interests,”172 and completely 
undermines the distinction between “property and rights to property” 
under § 6321.173  Justice Thomas further concluded that the majority 
misconstrued the Drye holding.174  Drye, he reasoned, held only that a 
state-law recognized disclaimer could not retroactively divest one’s 
interest in an estate.175  Therefore, Justice Thomas argued, a federal 
tax lien was not barred from attaching to the taxpayer’s interest in 
the estate.176  Justice Thomas stated that: 
By erasing the careful line between state laws that purport to 
disclaim or exempt property interests after the fact, which the 
federal tax lien does not respect, and state laws’ definition of 
property and property rights, which the federal tax lien does 
respect, the Court does not follow Drye, but rather creates a new 
federal common law of property.177 
Accordingly, Justice Thomas concluded that the federal tax lien 
could not attach to Mr. Craft’s interest in Berwyck until the tenancy 
by the entirety was terminated.178  Under the Michigan law, the 
entirety estate was not destroyed until the 1989 conveyance to Mrs. 
Craft.179  Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned, the IRS was only 
entitled to collect upon the one dollar Mr. Craft received from that 
sale180 and not from the proceeds from the 1992 sale to a third-
party.181  At the time of the 1992 transaction, Mrs. Craft owned 
 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 301 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172 Id. at 291. 
 173 Craft, 535 U.S. at 291. 
 174 Id. at 293. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id at 294. 
 177 Id. at 294. 
 178 Id. at 292. 
 179 Craft, 535 U.S. at 291 n.1. 
 180 Id. (“[H]alf of the proceeds, or 50 cents, was ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ 
‘belonging to’ Mr. Craft.”). 
 181 Id. 
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Berwyck in fee simple, and, consequently, Mr. Craft neither received 
nor was entitled to the proceeds.182  Therefore, according to Justice 
Thomas, the IRS was not entitled to any portion of the proceeds from 
the 1992 sale.183 
It is important to note that neither the majority nor the dissent 
disagreed as to whether a federal tax lien could attach to Mr. Craft’s 
interest in Berwyck.184  The main distinction between the two sides, 
rather, was when that lien could attach.185  The dissenting Justices 
opined that based on Michigan law, the entireties estate was wholly 
unreachable until after the tenancy was severed.186  Severance of the 
tenancy occurred upon the transfer of Berwyck to Mrs. Craft for one 
dollar.187  The majority, however, concluded that tax liens under § 
6321 attach to all property or interests in property, including 
entireties estates as defined by Michigan law.188  The tax lien, 
therefore, attached to Mr. Craft’s interest in Berwyck before the 1989 
conveyance, therefore prior to the severance of the tenancy.189  The 
dispute between the Justices over the primacy of state property law is 
precisely why the case is so significant.190  It is within the context of 
this conflict that the potential scope of Craft must be discussed. 
III. THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF CRAFT 
One cannot overlook the significance of the Craft decision.  The 
majority opinion raises the question of the proper roles for federal 
and state governments in defining what constitutes property or 
property rights.191  Prior to this decision, a federal tax lien under § 
6321 would only extend to property as defined under state law.192  
Allowing an individual spouse’s tax debt to attach to an entireties 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Craft, 535 U.S. at 294-95. 
 186 Id. at 291-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 287. 
 189 Id. 
 190 The question raised by Justice Thomas in his dissent pertains to the inherent 
contradiction between the majority’s holding in Craft and existing jurisprudence 
reserving the right to create and define property interests to the states.  See supra note 
5 and accompanying text. 
 191 This question is raised by the anomaly created by the Craft decision, and 
existing jurisprudence reserving the right to create and define property interests to 
the states.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 192 See Craft, 535 U.S. at 290-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This amorphous 
construct ignores the primacy of state law in defining property interests, eviscerates 
the statutory distinction between ‘property’ and ‘rights to property’.”). 
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property clearly indicates a change in the law.193  A second question 
presented by Craft is whether the holding might be extended to allow 
other types of federal liens or judgments to attach to state recognized 
entireties property,194 such as the possible attachment of federal drug-
forfeiture laws to property held in tenancy by the entirety. 
A. Craft In Light of the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” 
There is an implicit conflict between the holding in Craft and 
the “new federalism” advanced by the Rehnquist Court in recent 
years.195  The “new federalism” was foreshadowed by then Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery.196  National 
League of Cities was the first case since the New Deal where the Court 
enforced the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution against 
Congress.197  In National League of Cities, the Court struck down 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended 
minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements to all state, county, 
and municipal employees.198  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Rehnquist contended that the Tenth Amendment199 serves to prevent 
Congress from exercising “power in a fashion that impairs the States’ 
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”200  
The decision, although later overturned,201 reinvigorated the debate 
over the Court’s role in defining the boundaries of congressional 
power in light of federalism.202 
Four subsequent decisions clearly demonstrate the Rehnquist 
Court’s use of federalism as a justification for limiting the scope of 
congressional powers.203  In Gregory v. Ashcroft,204 two state judges 
challenged a provision of the Missouri State Constitution mandating 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 196 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 197 O’Brien, supra note 16, at 610. 
 198 Id. 
 199 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 200 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Frye v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 
(1975)). 
 201 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) 
(reaffirming that the Constitution divests the States of “their original powers”). 
 202 O’Brien, supra note 16, at 613. 
 203 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 37 (1999). 
 204 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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retirement at age seventy as violative of the Federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1970.205  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor held that in drafting the statute, Congress 
failed to demonstrate a clear discernable intent to “preempt the 
historic powers of the states,” and therefore upheld the state 
constitutional provision.206  Justice O’Connor noted that Congress 
must be explicit in stating its intent when using the Commerce 
Clause to infringe upon an area of state sovereignty.207 
In New York v. United States,208 the Court invalidated a provision of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985,209 
which required states to be “responsible for providing . . . for the 
disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste.”210  Once again writing for 
the majority, Justice O’Connor held that the “Federal Government 
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program.”211  The Court concluded that Congress had interfered with 
the legitimate legislative processes of the states.212  Citing McCullough 
v. Maryland,213 Justice O’Connor described an important function of 
the Court as protecting the sovereignty of states from congressional 
infringements.214  As such, Justice O’Connor held the challenged 
provisions unconstitutional.215 
In United States v. Lopez,216 the Court further solidified its “new 
federalism” doctrine.217  Lopez is particularly noteworthy because, for 
the first time since 1937, the Court invalidated a statute for exceeding 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.218  In Lopez, the 
Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,219 which 
prohibited possession of a firearm within one-thousand feet of a 
school.220  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked 
 
 205 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). 
 206 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. 
 207 Id. at 464. 
 208 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 209 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(j) (1988). 
 210 New York, 505 U.S. at 169. 
 211 Id. at 188. 
 212 Id. at 176. 
 213 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 214 Crusto, supra note 17, at 528 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 176). 
 215 New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 216 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 217 Crusto, supra note 17, at 528. 
 218 Id. 
 219 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)(1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)(1988)). 
 220 Id. (making it unlawful “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone”). 
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that “[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers.”221  Justice Rehnquist concluded that the statute 
did not fall within the commerce power vested in Congress by Article 
I of the Constitution.222 
Likewise, in Printz v. United States,223 the Rehnquist Court cited 
federalism concerns in overturning a federal statute mandating state 
enforcement of regulations related to private behavior.224  Printz 
involved a challenge to portions of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act225 that required state officials to conduct background 
checks on all handgun purchasers.226  Justice Scalia, delivering the 
Court’s opinion, held that Congress could not compel states to 
perform these background checks.227  The Court concluded that the 
federal government may not compel a state to exert its executive 
power without express constitutional authority.228 
The Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism” demonstrates a clear 
preference for limiting federal power.229  In that regard, the Craft 
decision is inapposite to the more general direction of the Court 
insofar as it contradicts longstanding precedent that states reserve the 
power to create and define property rights and forms of property 
ownership.230  Justice O’Connor read § 6321 broadly so as to infer 
Congress’s intent to preempt the historic power of a state, despite the 
absence of explicit language.231  Justice Thomas, however, sharply 
criticized the majority for ignoring precedent and infringing upon 
traditional state powers.232 
 
 221 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 222 Id. at 560. 
 223 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 224 Crusto, supra note 17, at 529. 
 225 Id. at n.51 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924-25 (Supp. 1993)). 
 226 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 909-11. 
 227 Id. at 933. 
 228 Id. at 909. 
 229 Crusto, supra note 17, at 519. 
 230 Oregon State Land Board, 429 U.S. at 378. 
 231 Craft, 535 U.S. at 283. 
 232 Id. at 294 (citing Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 n.3 (1960) 
(explaining that there is a difficulty with leaving the definition of property interests 
to a nebulous body of federal law, “because it ignores the long-established role that 
the States have played in creating property interests and places upon the courts the 
task of attempting to ascertain a taxpayer’s property rights under an undefined rule 
of federal law”). 
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B. Craft as a Catalyst in the Elimination of the Entireties Bar to the 
Attachment of Federal Drug Forfeitures? 
The Craft decision potentially opens the door to the elimination 
of the state-law entireties bar to other federal liens and judgments.233  
Under the ruling, states retain the power to define and regulate 
entirety properties as they see fit.234  The Craft decision, on its face 
however, reveals support for congressional authority to override state 
property law in collecting federal revenue.235  The circumstance most 
analogous to Craft is the possible attachment of federal drug-
forfeiture laws236 to property held in tenancy by the entirety.237 
In theory, the property interest of one spouse found guilty under 
federal forfeiture laws cannot be reached while the entireties estate 
remains in effect.238  However, Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Forfeiture Act of 1984 (“Act”)239 to provide the government with 
stronger weapons in the war on drugs.240  The Act specified stricter 
civil forfeiture procedures under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
and Prevention Act of 1970,241 authorizing the forfeiture of all real 
property “which is used, or intended to be used” to commit drug-
related offenses.242  Circuit courts are divided as to how the 
incompatibility of the tenancy by the entirety forms of property 
ownership and the federal forfeiture laws should be resolved.243 
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave.,244 
held that the civil forfeiture statute attached to all property interests 
 
 233 See Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
 234 Id. at 280-82. 
 235 Id. at 288. 
 236 See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. 
 237 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (2003) (stating forfeitures may attach to all “property, 
including any right”) (emphasis added).  This language is similar to that of the statute 
in Craft.  26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1954) (stating a lien may attach to all “property and rights to 
property”) (emphasis added). 
 238 Turano & Ward, supra note 8, at 309 (stating the guilty spouse has no separate 
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innocent spouse by barring forfeiture of entireties property). 
 239 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). 
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except those of an innocent spouse.245  However, under Florida law, 
an innocent spouse’s interest in an entireties estate encompasses the 
entire estate; therefore, the court held that there was no forfeitable 
interest in the entireties estate “at the present time.”246  The court 
noted that a future severance of the tenancy would create a separate 
interest in the property for the guilty owner, so that forfeiture of his 
interest would not impair the innocent spouse’s rights.247  The court 
concluded, however, as long as the entireties estate remained in 
effect, state law completely precluded attachment of the federal drug-
forfeiture statute when one spouse is innocent.248 
In contrast, the Third Circuit, in United States v. 1500 Lincoln 
Ave.,249 held a wife’s innocent owner defense did not preclude 
forfeiture of real property held by husband and wife as tenants by the 
entirety under Pennsylvania law.250  In making its decision, the Third 
Circuit considered the prior decision of the Eleventh Circuit.251  The 
court rejected the outcome in 15261 S.W. 209th Ave., and held the 
entireties bar frustrated the strong governmental interest in 
forfeiture.252  The court pointed out the absurdity of allowing a guilty 
person to keep property subject to forfeiture solely based on it being 
held in tenancy by the entirety.253  This observation is similar to the 
paradox noted by the Craft majority.254  The Third Circuit concluded 
that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act “permits the 
immediate forfeiture of the interest of the guilty spouse and thus 
serves the goal of forfeiting property used in illegal drug activities.”255 
Although potentially distinguishable based on the source of 
congressional power, Craft suggests the Court could determine that 
the state-defined rights of an entireties tenant add up to “property” 
under federal forfeiture laws.256  A broad reading of the 
 
 245 Id. at 1516. 
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 250 Id. at 77-78. 
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 256 Craft, 535 U.S. at 285 (concluding that under Michigan law of tenancy by the 
entirety, each tenant possesses sufficient rights in the estate to constitute property or 
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Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act (similar to Justice 
O’Connor’s reading of § 6321 in Craft) reveals congressional intent to 
reach all property interests of a guilty party.257  Based on the rational 
in Craft, state-created forms of property ownership define what rights 
an individual holds as to that property, but federal law determines 
whether those rights constitute property subject to federal sanctions, 
such as forfeiture or attachment of a lien.258  Based on this premise, 
one might comfortably predict further piercing of the entireties bar 
based on the apparent primacy of federal revenues over the state 
property designations.259  This possibility, however, is less predictable 
in light of the Rehnquist Court’s consistent protection of traditional 
state powers.260  Although Craft clearly indicates that the federal tax 
power supercedes concerns over those powers traditionally left to 
state governments, it could be read narrowly—and federal initiatives 
enacted under other powers, such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
and Prevention Act, could still conceivably be thwarted by the state-
created entireties bar.261 
IV. JUSTIFYING CRAFT: IMPLIED PREEMPTION OR A NEW FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY? 
In her majority opinion, Justice O’Connor read § 6321 broadly, 
and inferred Congress’s intent to “preempt the historic power” of a 
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state, notwithstanding the absence of explicit language.262  In Gade v. 
National Solid Waste Management Ass’n,263 the Supreme Court 
summarized the modern tests for preemption: 
Preemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled 
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.  
Absent explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least 
two types of implied preemption: field preemption, where the 
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it, and conflict preemption, where compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or 
where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.264 
Discerning the intent of Congress is the “ultimate touchstone” of 
every preemption case.265  Justice O’Connor read the plain language 
of the federal tax lien statute and inferred congressional intent, 
notwithstanding the relatively vague legislative history.266  This 
conclusion appears to satisfy one theory of implied preemption—that 
implied preemption occurs when a “state law impedes the 
achievement of a federal objective.”267  Presumably, the majority 
concluded the exemption resulting from the state-created entireties 
bar substantially interfered with the purpose and effect of § 6321.  
Based on congressional intent in drafting the statutory language, 
therefore, Michigan’s definition of entireties property in this context 
was preempted, and the lien attached to Mr. Craft’s interest in 
Berwyck prior to the conveyance to his wife.268 
Alternatively, in his dissent to Craft, Justice Thomas warned that 
the majority’s opinion symbolized the dawn of a new federal common 
law of property.269  Justice Thomas sharply criticized the majority, 
 
 262 Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
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stating the holding “ignores the primacy of state law in defining 
property interests, eviscerates the statutory distinction between 
‘property’ and ‘rights to property’ drawn by § 6321, and conflicts with 
an unbroken line of authority from this Court,270 the lower courts,271 
and the IRS.”272  Justice Thomas seemingly disagreed with the 
majority’s assertion that the potentially broad language of § 6321 
indicated congressional intent to reach property otherwise exempted 
under state entireties law.  Traditionally, even implied preemption 
must be prompted by clear congressional intent to limit federalism 
concerns.273  “In all preemption cases, and specifically those in which 
Congress has legislated in a field which the states have traditionally 
occupied,” courts presume state law is not preempted by federal 
legislation unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”274  Therefore, at least arguably, the ambiguity of the 
legislative history behind § 6321 potentially dooms Craft as an 
inappropriate exercise of implied preemption. 
What Justice Thomas’s dissent fails to address, however, is that 
Supreme Court jurisprudence also permits federal courts to narrowly 
create federal common law in the absence of a clear statutory 
prescription or a direct statutory conflict to protect uniquely federal 
interests.275  Federal courts are hesitant to create federal common law, 
recognizing that Congress should ultimately make the decision to 
displace state laws.276  Thus, proffers of federal common law are 
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characterized as a “necessary expedient.”277  Generally, federal 
common law may displace state law only when “necessary” to protect 
uniquely federal interests.278  Federal common law is appropriate 
when a uniform federal rule is needed to prevent the federal 
government’s rights from varying arbitrarily based upon the 
application of state law,279 or when there is “substantial conflict” 
between some federal interest and state law.280 
Craft seemingly passes muster under either theory.  First, the rule 
proffered in Craft, eliminating the entireties bar to the attachment of 
federal tax liens, was necessary to avoid an uneven application of the 
Federal Tax Code to citizens based on residence.  Prior to Craft, the 
ability of and extent to which the IRS reached the assets of similarly 
situated tax-debtors would vary by state.  Second, a conflict between 
state property definitions and federal tax policy is at the heart of the 
question presented to the Craft Court.  Therefore, at least facially, 
Craft represents an appropriate exercise of federal common-law 
authority.  The decision, at the very least, indicates “the dominance of 
federal law over state law in contests involving a federal tax lien.”281  
Notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s misgivings,282 and in the absence of 
any discernable congressional intent, the application of federal 
common law may have been the only way to effectively extinguish the 
inequities that will result from the continued recognition of a legal 
relic. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of how it is rationalized, Craft departs from the more 
general states rights posture of the Rehnquist Court, thus predicting 
its fallout is all the more difficult.  Ultimately, its scope might be 
limited to those narrow instances where the federal tax power is 
imposed as a restraint upon a state’s power to define property or 
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rights to property.283  Alternatively, it is possible that this case might 
be read more broadly, leading to the elimination of the entireties bar 
to the attachment of other federal liens or judgments.284 
Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately eliminates the 
entireties bar to all federal collections, the history of the tenancy 
coupled with its modern treatment by the Court in Craft indicates 
that its future is tenuous at best.  First, its continued existence can be 
justified only by familiarity because the circumstances under which it 
was created no longer exist.285  The tenancy by the entirety endeavors 
to protect marital property from seizure due to the financial 
difficulties of one spouse.286  As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in 
Craft, it is rooted in a feudal goal to protect a wife’s interest in the 
marital home should her husband pass away while indebted to third-
party creditors.287  This legal paternalism is not required to protect 
the interests of women in modern society.288  Furthermore, as the 
modern familial relationships continue to diversify, this legal relic’s 
preference for one relationship over another will lead to further 
inequities in the enforcement of liens and other judgments.289 
Moreover, the tenancy by the entirety presents an inherent 
contradiction between preserving an archaic legal fiction and 
achieving important federal prerogatives.290  At the focus of this 
incongruity is the proper role of state governments in defining 
property interests and the rights associated with them.291  As the Court 
in Craft noted, too often the tenancy by the entirety is used as an 
unjustifiable asset shield, resulting in arbitrary distinctions in liability 
under the federal tax code based on incompatible state laws.292  
Further recognition of the entireties bar perpetuates the same legal 
absurdity pointed out by Justice O’Connor in Craft—if neither spouse 
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has a recognizable interest in the entireties property, nobody does.293 
How broadly this so-called Craft doctrine is maintained or even 
extended depends ultimately on two factors.  First, whether or not 
Congress chooses to enter the fray, passing legislation specifically 
addressing the issue, or amending existing legislation, including § 
6321, to include express provisions dealing with the state-created 
entireties bar.  If Congress remains silent, however, the courts will 
ultimately decide whether the entireties bar is eliminated as to other 
federal collections, like drug forfeitures. 
As time passes, one might expect the legislatures of those states 
maintaining the tenancy to acknowledge its deficiencies, and cease 
recognition of it.  However, the legislative process moves very slowly, 
and adjustments to tenancy by the entirety have rarely kept up with 
social realities.294  Absent the elimination of the entireties bar by each 
individual state legislature still recognizing the tenancy, or express 
statutory provisions indicating clear congressional intent, the 
contradiction between federal interests and state laws is left to the 
judiciary to interpret. 
The role of the Supreme Court in addressing the future 
tenancies by the entirety is particularly perplexing.  Prior to the Craft 
decision, one might have expected the Rehnquist Court to uphold 
the absolute right of states to define and regulate property ownership 
in our federal system.295  It appears, however, that despite a broad 
reluctance of the Court to allow Congress to infringe upon the 
traditional roles of state government, the inequities resulting from an 
uneven application of federal tax liens could no longer be sanctioned 
by inaction.296  While it is clear that states reserve the right to define 
and recognize entirety estates, it is equally clear that the federal 
government, at least with regard to the tax power, will no longer be 
bound by its draconian classifications. 
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